Ovefilled Portable Tank EURU

1.

Ovefilled Portable Tank EURU 0941758
Spontaneous combustion – 14/06/2024
20.06.2024

2.

TOPICS
1. Background.
2. Course of events.
3. Damage.
4. Potential causes.
5. Future preventive actions.

3.

BACKGOUND
1. Plant is responsible for transloading of yellow phosphorus. In this year most of deliveries we
received from Kazakhstan.
2. It was third delivery– 15 tank-containers.
3. In this a tank-container no. EURU0941758.

4.

COURSE OF EVENTS
1. 14/06/2024 at 9:00 we opened „AIRLINE” valve to reduce inside pressure and about 10:00 begun
warming up set of 8 units of tank containers to prepare for unloading on Saturday 15/06.
2. At 14:22 from opened „AIRLINE” valve excess water and phosphorus began to leak out, which
resulted in a fire.
3. Operators immediately took an action
and they put out of fire.
The thermometer mounted on the container
showed an internal temperature of
approximately 35 degrees - only.

5.

COURSE OF EVENTS
4. After the fire was extinguished, due to the high contamination of the interior of the connection with
phosphorus, it was decided don’t use the AIRLINE connection anymore, but the next one valve
which is called VENT.

6.

COURSE OF EVENTS
5. To avoid again in the future leakage of P4 on the top of tank-container operators installed pipe for
balancing pressure and again begun Warming up the tank-container.

7.

COURSE OF EVENTS
6. At 23:50, an uncontrolled phosphorus leak and a violent fire began. The operators immediately
took an action at first: cut steam supply and after that started extinguishing the fire.
The thermometer mounted on the
container 5 min before fire showed
an internal temperature of
approximately 60 deg.

8.

COURSE OF EVENTS
8. After 5-6 minutes the fire was extinguished by our team. We didn't request for fire brigade.
Fire brigade team arrived
about midnight and
probably was requested
by our neighbour –
Messer company.
They didn’t take any
action, saw that
everything is ok and went
back.

9.

DAMAGE
1. Top of the tank container – aluminium working platform (melted partially).
2. Partially fired and sooty external lining of the tank-container.
3. Partially burned paint and sooty part of the railway platform.

10.

POTENTIAL CAUSES
1. Overfilled ISO TC’s during loading in Kazakhstan.
Each tank container from Kazakhstan has more P4 the they declarated. Mentioned had about 900 kg more than we suspected.
2. Not working properly thermometer.
After 4 hours of warming up 10:00 – 14:00 temp. was 35deg but appear first accident with leakage of phosphorus. It means that
P4 was melted – temp inside had to over 41 deg.
3. Valve described as „VENT” has a 30cm long pipe deep into the tank.
It mean that hole VENT didn't have access to the air area
in the tank but was dipped in the melted P4.
Increased inside temperature generate higher air layer pressure
but this layer was closed - no possible released / decreasing
higher air pressure.
The increased pressure puts pressure on water + phosphorus
and this then generates an uncontrolled release of phosphorus.

11.

FUTURE PREVENTIVE ACTIONS
1. Force the supplier to properly refuel the units. Absolutely don't accept overfilled tanks.
2. Force of the owner of tanks correct description of connections. Connection VENT has a
30cm long pipe to deep of the tank. It was not possible used it to reduce overpressure.
3. Completely eliminate pipes into the tank in others connection than loading/unloading P4.
4. Construction of an emergency sprinkler system along the tracks where tanks cars are
heated. Currently the sprinkler are only on the pouring platform.

12.

Thank you
Dossa Chemicals Pvt. Ltd.