Nikos Zachariadis and the Komintern. Greek communists in Tashkent

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2. The Comintern: Institutions and people

Dr Nikolaos Papadatos, University of Geneva
Global Studies Institute
Email: [email protected]
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3. INDEX

1 Nikos Zachariadis and the Komintern
2 Nikos Zachariadis after the liberation
3 Greek communists in Tashkent
4 Zachariadis and his supporters: The facts
5 Testimonials of the protagonists
6 The hidden soviet agenda against Zachariadis
7 Soviet intervention in the Tashkent community
8 The method of Soviet’s intervention
9 The struggle between Zachariadis and the Kremlin’s protégés
10 The decision of the CPSU
11 Zachariadis and the CPSU: The historical context
12 Soviet interference in the KKE
13 The split of the Tashkent community
14 The main aspects of the split of the Tashkent Community
15 Zachariadis and his last fight
16 Nikos Zachariadis: letter from Сургут to the members of KKE
17 The Leninist Marxist Organization of Tashkent
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6.

Nikos Zachariadis and the Komintern
The start of the Second World War, the triple occupation of Greece, and the
reluctance of the traditional bourgeois parties created a vacuum of power that
the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) tried to cover. The anti-fascistantihitlerian struggle of the popular masses was largely organized by the
KKE. The organizational disintegration of the KKE during the period of
Metaxas’ dictatorship did not shake either the political faith nor the
revolutionary will of its members. Dimitris Partsalidis, Yannis Ioannidis and
Yiorgis Siantos played a key role during the fascist occupation as leaders.
Their promotion and preservation in the power of the party is directly related
to Nikos Zachariadis. Dimitriyev or Dimitriou, after graduating from the
Communist Workers' University of the East (КУТВ), fought in Greece from
1923 to 1928 under conditions of illegality and persecution. Throughout this
period he played a leading role within the Federation of Communist Youth of
Greece (OKNE) and became a member of its Central Committee Office. In
1929 Zachariadis was jailed as he was the No. 1 suspect for the murder of the
archeomarxist Georgopapadatos.
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7.

With the help of Thanassis Claras (Aris Velouchiotis) he escaped from prison
and, at after a proposal signed by the CC of the KKE, he was again sent for
higher education to Moscow. Meanwhile, the period 1928-1935 was decisive
for the Comintern. Its 6th Congress, which took place from July 17th to
September 1, 1928, outlined the changes that had occurred within the CPSU.
During this time, Stalin had, to a large extent, gained control and initiative at
the expense of his intra-party opponents. The main objectives of the
Comintern can be presented as follows : a. the anti-war struggle and the
protection of the Soviet Union, b. the fight against "right opportunism" and c.
the "liquidation of Trotskyism" within the Communist Parties. These
principles where the sine qua-non condition of safeguarding the communist
parties of the Comintern. The result was the "Bolshevization" of the local
parties which can describes as a long term process.
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8.

The "Comintern's appeal" in November 1931 constituted the beginning of the
"Bolshevization" process of the KKE. But who took the decision to appoint
Nikos Zachariadis to the General Secretariat of the Party?
The pole Maksymilian Henryk Horwitz, (Максимилиа́н Ге́нрик Хо́рвиц),
with the Soviet pseudonym Вале́цкий , was a member of the Polish
Communist Party. In 1925 he joined the Executive Committee of the
Comintern and in the same year he joined the ВКП (б). He was, among other
things, responsible for the Greek communist party. The crisis of the KKE
leadership in 1929-1931 coincides with the global economic recession of that
period. In the early 1920s, the Soviet economist Никола́й Дми́триевич
Кондра́тьев had predicted the downward trend of the global capitalist
economy. The extent of the crisis of the late 1920s confirmed this assessment.
The collapse of the New York Stock Exchange on 29 October 1929 was the
detonator of the global economic depression.
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9.

International capital flows have narrowed considerably, and a number of
countries (Great Britain, Austria, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, USA,
etc.) have faced major political and economic shocks. Greece has not been an
exception as the global capitalist crisis has rocked its economy: Numerous
strikes occurred as a result of the economic downfall which exacerbated
dramatically the living standards of the masses creating a political turmoil
within which the Communist Party of Greece played an active role. The way
in which strikes will be exploited by the KKE would be largely determined by
the existence of objective labor-revolt conditions, in other words, by the
actual dispositions of workers and other working strata of the Greek
population.
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10.

On this issue a strong confrontation within the leadership of the KKE arose.
One side of the CC, the so-called Haitas-Efthyiadis group, argued that "the
general political strike" was not a direct political task, as the maturing of the
objective conditions had to be ensured beforehand. At the same time, this
group emphasized the need for organizational strengthening of the party. The
other group of the leadership, the so-called Siantos-Theos group, favored the
immediate declaration of a general political strike aiming for a "rapid
liberalization of the labor-masses and the new revolutionary rise" in order to
seize power.
However, the Comintern apparatus was not only interested in the class
struggle in Greece. The main objective was the unconditional alignment of
the Greek communist with the general political objectives of the Comintern.
This fact also contributed to the famous escape of the following Communists
from the prison of Syggrou in April 1931: Lefteris Apostolou, Andronikos
Haitas, Costas Efthyiadis, Orpheas Economidis, Vasilis Asikis, Markos
Markovitis, Dimitris Paparigas, Periklis Karaskoyias and Grigoris
Grigoriadis. They then went to Moscow together with Giorgos Siantos,
Giorgos Kolozov and Giorgos Douvas.
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11.

During their stay in Moscow in June 1931, the Comintern leadership
criticized the party's action. Valetsky said:
“First of all, in my opinion there is no doubt that all the speakers here, the
Greek comrades of the leadership, do not fully understand the tragic situation
of the party. There is a certain tone in all the speeches that they made some
mistakes, that "we do not deny that such mistakes have been made before us
and that they will happen after us in Greece and other countries". "The
Communist International corrects our mistakes, and therefore we will not go
against the Comintern." Nothing special happened, especially within the
Greek party, we know that such mistakes have been made in the past. I think
this mentality has to be crushed. What was happened belongs to the worst
(tradition) of the history of the Comintern and of the Greek party. The
comrades are thinking: "we are living in Greece all these recent years with
some hesitation, but in general (there is) the most serious economic crisis and
the difficult situation of our class enemies, the increase of the labor
movement, the increase of the struggles of workers and farmers". And, at this
point the Party is not just stagnant, it does not stay behind, but it is in a state
of collapse.
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12.

Comrades, I will not talk about numbers, I will not quote events that all Greek
comrades recognize and about which the Greek reality is screaming. During
the years of the fascist and social-fascist government of Venizelos - during the
years of development of the mass movement – which forces were developed
in Greece? Social-fascism was developed, archeomarxists, social workers
were developed. You will not find this phenomenon, perhaps, in such sizes
and in such form in any country of modern Europe. We also have other parties
with internal problems, for example in England and in France. However, there
is no comparison with what we have in Greece. I will not compare Greece
with Germany and Poland, but even if I get the worst examples, there is no
such situation anywhere as in Greece”.
During these conversations in Moscow between the leadership of the KKE
and the Balkan Secretariat of the Executive Committee of the Comintern,
Valetsky vigorously condemned the "fight without principles" of the Politburo
and the CC of the KKE. In the same debate, in June 1931, shortly before his
formal appointment to the Greek Party Secretariat, Nikos Zachariades stated
the following before the Balkan Secretariat of the Executive Committee of the
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Comintern :

13.

About the party’s tasks. I believe that the Communist International's decision
gives to the party the necessary political platform, the party will be able to
work and fight to implement this decision in practice in order to fulfill the
tasks before it. The most fundamental issues of our party are the following:
Firstly, the political lack of perspective and the confusion which arose must
be cleared, because what has already been said about Greece, the political
crisis, the political elements of the crisis within the armed campaigns of the
peasants in the city, etc., the above shows that in practice we do not feel the
real situation in Greece and that we cannot give to the party a proper political
direction which could lead the party to make steps forward, to solve the tasks
that lie before it. The main issue is the organizational issue. Let's penetrate in
the working companies and raise this issue not only in talks, not just in
words, but rather in putting the responsible comrades, with a specific
program and under control, into working industries and conducting
there a real Bolshevik work in order to create cells, in order to conquer
the workers of these companies under the slogans of the party.
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14.

The organizational strengthening of the party is crucial, the creation of an
elementary party mechanism, the lack of which now does not allow the party
to move ahead… It is then necessary, on the basis of these requests, to direct
our work towards the labor strikes within the trade unions, the struggle of
their committees and to mobilize the masses… But we cannot even do this
job. Only phrases, only calls to counter-attack and be mobilized for the strike.
We have to go to the masses themselves and carry out their organizational
work. This, of course, is far more difficult than talking about fighting.
We must specifically address the issue of eliminating the influence of socialfascism and agrarian-fascism on the working environment. The Greek party
with proper political direction and proper organizational work has all the
objective capabilities to carry out this task as soon as possible. We must focus
on anti-war work in Greece, where there are great objective conditions for
this job. We have this spontaneous movement there, and Communist youth is
doing this job without the help of the party.
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15.

We need to define this work, we must help the communist youth with all our
means to align our front in this area. In Greece we have great traditions in this
area, not a little experience, and now we need to give to this area the main
attention. … I want to highlight another issue, it is the theoretical front. Our
theoretical front suffers miserably, it is very weak and this led us to such an
impasse. We also need to gather the necessary forces in this area in order to
reveal the theoretical face of our party on the issues of Leninism”.
Bela Kun, one of the leaders of the Balkan section of the Comintern, attended
the meeting and just after Zachariadis’ speech stated the following:
“The Communist International will take a decision and will create such an
instrument that will guide the implementation of this decision in Greece. I
think that this body must be set up by comrades who are now working in
Greece, by workers who are now leading the organizations and who have in
fact shown that they can really develop the party. In addition, all forces of
КУНМЗ and МЛШ must be assembled in Greece for direct work in order to
conduct the implementation of this decision on the ground”.
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16.

Then, one of the leaders of the International Leninist School of Moscow, a
member of the Soviet secret services, Panov unambiguously condemned the
"factional struggle" raising a question of discipline. According to Triantafilov,
the issues of the KKE were no longer based either on debates or on
disagreements, but on the Bolshevik discussion of realization,
implementation, the implementation of Comintern’s decision in Greece”.
And he concluded with the following words:
“It is time, comrades, to raise the question of discipline. There is no
discipline in the Greek party. In my view, the essential thing now ... is to
stop, eradicate, completely eradicate every factionalist psychology. Then
we can really deal with the facts with dignity”.
The final blow to the KKE’s “factional” deviations was given by Kolarov:
“… The Greek Party is suffering by the strong influence of petty bourgeois
intellectuals who are at the moment in the leadership, and therefore we can
see in every decision the survival of a revolutionary phraseology under which
the right and left opportunist practices are covered. The Greek party, due to
this fact, was removed from the masses, from the workers, from the peasants.
Due to the strengthening of this gap in the last period, the position of fascists,
farmers, social-fascists and all other petty bourgeois parties is strengthened.
In this field there is loss of influence, loss of the organizational discipline of
the party. On this ground was implemented the factional struggle” ...
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17.

The latest principles expressed by Kolarov were directly related to the
nomination of Nikos Zachariadis as leader of the KKE. The "ability to
organize the struggle of the masses" demanded, according to the Comintern
modus operandi, an unconditional fight against all "centrifugal communist
tendencies" (Trotskyist, Bukharinist etc.), a strict discipline and the
implementation of Comintern’s decisions in Greece. The theoretical and
ideological aspects of the KKE had to take into consideration all the political
and economic changes that gradually progressed into the USSR
(collectivization-industrialization). The discussion of June 1931 between the
leadership of the KKE and the Comintern led to the appointment of Nikos
Zachariadis to the leadership of the KKE. On July 2, 1931, Bella Kun, after
the hearings on the Greek issue, announced the following to the
representatives of the KKE:
“I now propose the establishment of a committee which, on the basis of the
exchange of views, will consist of the following comrades: Valetsky, Kolarov
and Panov”.
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18.

Valetsky, Kolarov, and Panov, considering the progress of studies of Nikos
Zachariadis at the International Leninist School, his firm opposition to any
trotskyist direction, his organizational skills, his conscious military discipline,
proposed the appointment of a member of the Komsomol to the leadership of
the Greek party. This suggestion has been the subject of a study by the Balkan
Committee of Comintern and eventually ratified by the supreme Soviet
leadership, which was also the absolute leadership of the Comintern:
Manuiliski and Molotov endorsed the appointment of Nikos Zachariadis as
the Secretary-General of the KKE.
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19. Nikos Zachariadis after the liberation

Foreign policy of the USSR towards Greece: 1944-1949
1. The December riots in Athens and the geopolitical stakes of the Kremlin.
2. The new Bulgarian data and the comparison of Russian and Bulgarian
sources.
3. The Greek communists in the context of the cold war: the case of the
Tashkent communists.
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21.

Urgent (white sea and Athens)
15.12.1944:
Roussos left a few days ago.
Grandfather advises
to continue the fight.
We do our best.
Bulgarian State Archive:
TsPA / 1/7/199
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26. Greek communists in Tashkent

After the defeat on Grammos, the Greek communists were divided into two
main groups: the civilian population went to the People’s democracies of the
East; the military divisions of the Democratic Army were transferred to the
USSR in Tashkent. the People’s democracies of Albania, Hungary, Poland,
Bulgaria, East Germany and Romania welcomed Greek communists,
including those who were seriously wounded and sick. Henceforth Bucharest
became the official headquarter of the Politburo and the CC of the KKE.
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31. Zachariadis and his supporters: The facts

• The bloody events that took place on the night of 10 to 11 September 1955
in the capital of Uzbekistan.
• The rejection of the KKE program project by the Soviets in 1954.
• Dezhacariadization and destalinization: The arrest of Beria, the Rioumine
and Abakumov affair, Djafar Bagirov etc.
• The Greek civil war, the experience of forced expatriation of the partisans
and their families, the hardships endured by Greek refugees during the first
years of their settlement on Soviet soil may partly explain the split of this
community .
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32. Testimonials of the protagonists

Giatroudakis: “It has been said unofficially that Stalin wanted the Greek civil
war in order to free Yugoslavia and Albania ... So we separated into two
groups: the Zachariadians and the anti-Zachariadians. The conflict took place
because some of us said that Zachariadis was right to give us the second
partisan war, while we were saying that this was an opportunistic way of
thinking”.
Dimitriou: “The civil war has had an impact on our mental attitude. It was a
trauma that left deep roots in our psychology and the formation of our ideas
was influenced by this reality”.
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33. The organization of the Greek communists in Tashkent

According to D. Seveliaguine and Mantcha, members of the International
Department of the CC of the CPSU :
“The direction of the Greek Communists is by a Party Committee, which is
elected by a Conference. Daily political action is led by the Bureau of the
Party Organization (9 persons) and the Secretariat (3 persons). Political
refugees are publishing their own newspaper in Greek and in SlavoMacedonian”.
An additional problem: the relations of Nikos Zachariadis with Tito and the
relations of the USSR with Yugoslavia.
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34.

Thomas Dritsios, a member of the Tashkent community, states: “The climate
conditions of Central Asia, completely inadequate for a southern European,
[...], the different racial and human environment, the cultural undeveloped
conditions, the very hard conditions of accommodation, the fixation - by
“daily orders” the rules of an authoritarian life within the closed framework
of the refugee community, these living conditions, particular and unfavorable,
always fueled dissatisfaction and this type of dissatisfaction was expressed in
the incidents of Tashkent”.
However, why the Greek partisans were transferred to Tashkent?
Soviet authorities wanted, at the beginning, to have an additional military
reserve which could have contributed to the safeguarding of the People's
democracies, to the protection of the USSR's borders in order to
counterbalance the Western pressures.
Gradually, this policy changed, especially after Stalin’s death: the Greek
communists were advised and then forced to accept the new “Marxist
principles”.
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35. The hidden soviet agenda against Zachariadis

• By the end of 1954 the Soviets tended to oppose any power and decision of
the elected organs of the Greek party.
• The objective was obviously to limit the responsibility of the KKE
Secretary-General in a crisis situation.
• In 1954, the KKE's BP received information about a defamatory campaign
Implemented by some of the guarded soldiers of the Democratic Army
disrupting communist values.
Kitsikopoulos’case, a pro-Zachariadian Party member, revealed that “the
Soviets had offered him a job ... when he was secretary of the KKE’s
Organization in Tashkent in order to replace the KKE leadership ... controlled
by Zachariadis by another”. (Testimony of Zygouras Palaiologos, former
cadre of KKE).
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36.

Papaioannou, another protagonist of the same period said: “I repeat: the split
of the Greek communists in Tashkent was planned by the Soviets in the
Kremlin. Its preparation was assigned by Moscow to the Soviet leaders and
commanders of Tashkent who were responsible for all the technical aspects of
life within the Greek community of political refugees. Saakov was the leader
of the plan.
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37.

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38. Soviet intervention in the Tashkent community

• Panos Dimitriou says: “The anti-Stalinist followers of Khrushchev's group
were sympathetic to the struggle against Zachariadis and his past and
favored our struggle. That is to say: we were in the same camp and they
surrounded us with their benevolence”.
• The Soviets meticulously prepared the political end of Nikos Zachariadis
and his entourage.
• A mission composed by the previous Generals of the Democratic Army,
Fokas and Vaϊnas tried to collect detailed information with regards to the
Tashkent’s opposition and send their reports to Bucharest where was based
the leadership of the Greek Party after the end of the Greek civil war.
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39.

Their significant report stated :
“We tried to put in the right way the group of Chotouras and his supporters,
the fractional anti-party group, which was diverted from the direction, in
order to understand the damage caused by their actions against our Party ...
The attitude of soviet comrades Борис Пономарёв and Сааков, who
continuously supported them, encouraged them to continue their work. We
reported to the comrades Пономарёв and Сааков all that was available to us
about Chotouras-Fourkiotis and so on. But they distrusted these statements.
They tried to convince us that this type of behavior was the result of inherent
errors due to the weaknesses of Tashkent’s Organization. They believed what
Chotouras, Fourkiotis, Dimitriou, Rosios said to them ... As a result, the
comrades, Пономарёв and Сааков, openly supported Chotouras, Fourkiotis,
Rosios, and so on.”
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40. The method of Soviet’s intervention

• The fight between Panos Dimitriou and Nikos Zachariadis and the Soviet
position.
• The newspaper “for the victory”: “The assimilation of Marxism-Leninism our capital duty”.
• During September 1955, the Soviet Committee composed by Komarov,
Gromov, Rumyantsev, Vinogradov and Novikov stated: “Comrade
Zachariadis ... defends the following idea, Dimitriou’s position about the
defeat of the second revolution in Greece is a revisionist one [...] because it
identifies the causes of the defeat of the two revolutions by reducing to the
same degree the arguments and the motives that led to this defeat”.
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41.

• The following note, sent to the headquarters of KKE in Romania, summed
up the animosity between the “Zachariadians and anti-Zachariadians”:
"How did the Nazis let Zachariadis free to leave the Dachau camp without
hurting him?
• Collection of letters, notes and reports against the KKE Stalinist leadership
were sent to the Presidium of the USSR.
• A problem between KKE’s leadership and the new leadership of the CPSU
was presented as an internal (political, theoretical, etc.) problem of the
Greek Communists based in Tashkent.
• The new Soviet approach: the method of “communist petitions”.
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42. The struggle between Zachariadis and the Kremlin’s “protégés”

• Vlantas: “No, comrades. Anyone who criticizes our “governing bodies” in
Tashkent does not criticize the CPSU. You are not the CPSU. Do you
believe that the Party Committee of our Organization in Tashkent is the
equal of the CPSU? Do not be deceived”.
• Who is the real representative of the CPSU: the main question that referred
to the recent history of the KKE.
• The dismissal of representatives of the Tashkent Conference (the Fourkiotis
affair).
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43. The decision of the CPSU

• The Presidium of the CPSU and in particular, A.I. Mikoyan, Voroshilov,
Molotov, Saburov, Suslov, published the following statement:
• “Given the numerous requests and letters of the Greek political refugees
received by the CPSU during the period of September-December 1955 ...
the CC of the CPSU would advise the CC of the KKE to a) Convene the
Plenum of the Organization’s Committee of the KKE in Tashkent, b)
Organize the General Assemblies of all the Basic Organizations of the
Greek Communists, c) convoke a Conference in Tashkent ... 2. Actively
encourage the CC of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan to provide a daily
assistance to the organizations of the Greek communists. 3. The CC
considers that Comrade Zachariadis can publish the above decision of the
CC of the CPSU”.
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44. Zachariadis and the CPSU: The historical context

François Fejtö writes: “The cultural differences between the Communist
Parties of the People’s democracies came to light during the period of deStalinization, following Khrushchev's attempt to reform the methods of action
and the relations between the “Brother Parties”. By recognizing, in his
Belgrade declaration of May 1955 and Moscow’s declaration of October 31,
1956, the “plurality of paths to socialism”, the Soviet leader opened the door
to two opposing manifestations of repressed autonomist tendencies. (François
FEJTÖ, The end of popular democracies, the ways of post-communism,
Seuil, Paris, 1992, 64).
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45.

In particular, The Komarov Committee emphasized the following words of
Zachariadis: “At the Executive Conference and other Conferences in
Tashkent, Comrade Zachariadis repeated several times: “If Tito had not
stabbed us in the back we would not be now in the Soviet Socialist Republic
of Uzbekistan but in the free territories of Greece”. It should be added that the
CC of the KKE has not published its opinion so far in view of the results of
the Soviet-Yugoslav talks ... As it is obvious ..., Comrade Zachariadis
continues to insist on his old theses and does not seek to revise his political
opinions”.
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46. Soviet interference in the KKE

The creation of an International Committee made up of representatives of six
“brother parties”, following the appeals of the Greek Communists. Otto
Kuusinen, Soviet Delegate, Anton Tanev (Dontcho) Jugov, Prime Minister of
Bulgaria, Béla Kovács, Member of the Hungarian Workers' Party, Gheorghe
Gheorghiu-Dej, First Secretary of the Romanian Workers' Party, Franciszek
Mazur, Representative of the United Polish Workers' Party and Rudolf Barak
of the Czechoslovak Communist Party were the founding members of this
Special Committee.
Karl Afanasievitch Semenkov, Special Attaché of the International
Department of the CC of the CPSU who, in 1956, was responsible for the
relations between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the KKE,
stated I, 1999 that “the Dej report was written at the headquarters of the
CPSU by [... Pyotr Ivanovich Petrov Mantchkha [...]”. (Ethnos, August 30,
1999).
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47.

After these accusations, Zachariadis declared on February 21, 1956: “In 1947,
at the June meeting, at the Central Committee in the presence of Stalin,
Molotov and Zhdanov, the action of the Party was fully approved without any
comment ... Comrade Molotov even personally approved the fact that we did
not start the uprising immediately in the cities, but step by step, because we
did not intend to involve the English within the conflict”.
• The International Committee declared that the reopening of hostilities by
the KKE in 1946-1947 was “an adventurism”. This thesis was categorically
refused by Zachariadis.
• This International Committee revived the activity of the former “anti-Party”
cadres (a internal conflict related to the Stalin-Tito split, struggle between
Marcos Vafiadis and Zachariadis).
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48.

• The International Committee tried to legitimize the ouster of Zachariadis
through an “institutional” way, via legal methods endorsed by the new
“leninist principles” fully and unconditionally accepted by the new
leadership of the KKE. (Koliyannis, Partsalidis, Dimitriou, etc). Discuss
also the methods, an ad hoc question.
• Zachariadis was officially sacked by the KKE during the 7th enlarged
Plenum of 1957. At the same time a process of reeducation started, the new
leadership proceeded to the withdrawal of previous “sacred” books, as for
example the book of Zachariadis: “Nikos ZACHARIADIS, J.V. STALIN,
the Master and the guide, the comrade and the friend (speech delivered on
December 12, 1949 ... in Greece, editions of KKE CC.) - RGANI, 5/28/419,
ff, 305, 306, 307.
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49. The split of the Tashkent community

To the Government of the USSR, the Prosecutor's Office and Attorney
General Руденко, (Рома́н Андре́евич Руде́нко)
From the Marxist-Leninist group, political refugees from Tashkent, March 16,
1972. We sent you a final letter asking for the implementation of the UN
resolutions on human rights.
In the Soviet Union, it has always been proclaimed that any citizen has the
right to appeal to any higher body for an answer in a short period of time;
when we spoke to you, you did not apply this rule. Two months have elapsed,
and we have received no response, and in general you have never answered
our letters, thus violating your own rules.
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50.

In the same report of the delegation, we find this information:
“Four Secretaries of the Party’s Organization in Tashkent have already been
ousted by us. (These are Touloudis, residing in the 13th City, Kokkas,
residing in the 6th, Kiakos, second Secretary of the 6th City and Vlamopoulos
residing in Gorstroi). These exclusions had no effect on the members of
their organizations or themselves. They even continued to carry out
many tasks related to the Party within their Organizations”.
Consequently, the new direction of the Party (Koliyannis, Partsalidis,
Dimitriou) was not recognized by the majority of the Greek communists
residing in Tashkent.
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51. The main aspects of the split of the Tashkent Community

The non-recognition of the Party Committee in Tashkent.
The end of the organizations of the Greek communist refugees of Tashkent:
their gradual transition to the CPSU became the main goal of the KKE and of
the soviet authorities.
The creation of a series of political groups within the Tashkent community:
the “Zachariadians”, the “anti-Zachariadians”, the “marcists”. Splits within
the splits.
The split of Zachariadians into two groups: one was in favor of the USSR, the
other in favor of China during the period of antagonism between China and
the USSR in the 1960s.
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52.

Zachariadis and his last fight
From 1956 to early June 1962 Zachariadis worked as director of "Lesprom" a state enterprise in the region of Borovichi, near Novgorod. He was
practically exiled. In 1957 he was expulsed by the KKE. After his visit to
Moscow and his letter to the Greek embassy was severely punished by the
soviet authorities and was sent to Surgut, in Siberia. The accusation of
“traitor”, “enemy of the soviet state”, “collaborator with the Nazis” was
reintroduced. There he continued to work on another forest industry. He was
trying for many years to obtain his civil rights back:
1. the identity of political refugee,
2. the freedom to travel within the Soviet Union
3. and the possibility to go back to Greece.
4. In August 1973, he put an end to his life.
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53.

To the newspaper "Avgi"
Mr. Director,
Please publish my letter below.
On February 1, 1962, I sent a letter to the General Prosecutor of Greece as I
wanted to know if any accusation against my communist and revolutionary
action is still pending, declaring that I am ready to appear before the
authorities of justice in order to confront, rebuke and overthrow any category
published by the reaction against the Popular Revolutionary movement,
active member of which I stood.
On April 8, 1962, I got the answer which was categorically negative, they (the
Greek authorities) did not even accept my request and they inform me that
they will send it back.
Consequently Karamanlis, together with his overseas bosses revealed
themselves.
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54.

They know how to slander, defame and dirty the popular movement.
But when they have the chance to send to court someone who is supposed to
be one of the most successful "criminals" in this very critical period of our
post-war history, they run continuously away and they try to escape, they
become cowards.
They have no courage to look into the eyes and see the truth.
I protest with all my force against these illegal Government’s actions and I
declare that my efforts will persist in order to force Karamanlis and his
associates to accept the above fight.
With this opportunity, I want to make clear this: besides the enemies of the
people, the enemies of the national identity and independence, besides native
and foreign enemies, besides the enemies and opponents of democratic
Greece and communism, I have no open issues to sort out with anyone, nor
can I have with anyone else.
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55.

When I saw how the government and the whole reaction were dealing with
my request, I was once again convinced that I acted correctly.
Please forgive me for the inconvenience and I thank for the hospitality.
April 10, 1962
With respect,
Nikos Zachariadis
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56.

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57.

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58. Nikos Zachariadis: letter from Сургут to the members of KKE

The love, respect, and deep appreciation that Communists and hundreds of millions
of workers and generally honest people express to Marx-Engels-Lenin cannot be
considered as a cult of personality. For many years, I, like all the Communists of the
earth, educated foremost by the КПСС, believed in Stalin and I placed him next
to Lenin. I was believing faithfully honestly and unconditionally. To some
extent, this can be proved by the fact that for Stalin I wrote with enthusiasm, from
the deepest of my soul when I was in the cemetery-prison of Corfu and when I did
not know if I would go out of it. In all other cases I was opposed to this kind of
tradition consisting in place any leader close to Lenin and Stalin.
As far as I am concerned, this opinion was expressed openly during conferences and
meetings. Generally speaking, I also mentioned this to the other parties in early
1948, especially to the representatives of the КПСС and to the Albanian party.
For Stalin, the reality has also forced me to revise to a great extent my
appreciation to him.
11.05.1966
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59. The Leninist Marxist Organization of Tashkent

To the Government of the USSR, the Prosecutor's Office and Attorney
General Руденко, (Рома́н Андре́евич Руде́нко)
From the Marxist-Leninist group, political refugees from Tashkent, March 16,
1972. We sent you a final letter asking for the implementation of the UN
resolutions on human rights.
In the Soviet Union, it has always been proclaimed that any citizen has the
right to appeal to any higher body for an answer in a short period of time;
when we spoke to you, you did not apply this rule. Two months have elapsed,
and we have received no response, and in general you have never answered
our letters, thus violating your own rules.
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60.

We ask you: when will you answer our questions? Until when will the doors
be closed for us? Since 1956 ... we are asking to go to Albania, to go to our
neighboring country and this was done following an official proposal from
your Red Cross.
We then paid 25 rubles. But you did not do anything. Later, we again 750
signatures of our comrades who asked to go to the People's Republic of
China. For once again, you have not answered, or rather, you have probably
answered us with an inappropriate measure for the Soviet regime: violence.
You responded by exile, prisons and violent means. Since then, you have
continued the same tactics. We make petitions, and you, you use all the
violent means that you have at your disposal, even the primitive, inhuman and
criminal way of принудительное лечение (in Russian in the text) turning
us into madmen.
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61.

Nothing is solved by violence. You proclaim it yourself, a thousand times,
through television, radio and newspapers. Why are you using it? Do you
disagree with yourself? We will remind you that our problem is waiting for its
solution.
Free our leader Nikos Zachariadis. Release our comrade Kostas Kyrgiannis
who has been dying for three years of tuberculosis, heart disease and its
consequences in your prison, in your psychiatric hospital; these problems are
the result of the conditions of isolation (seclusion) of our old comrade, the
combatant of our country.
Let us go to the People's Republic of China because here we are not welcome.
We are waiting for your response as soon as possible. Reply yourself, not
through your organs in Tashkent. (Marxist-Leninist group, Tsouvairis, Tatsi
...).
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ГАРФ/ 8331/36/1548.

62.

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