Current Threat – Nuclear Materials Trafficking

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Central Africa

1. Central Africa

Current Threat Conditions
U.S. National Security Objectives
– CINC Operational Objectives
IPB Overview
–
–
–
–
Battlespace Environment
Impacts on the Battlespace Environment
Tactics, Techniques, Procedures Analysis
Opposition Course of Action Analysis
Blue Force Course of Action Analysis
– Force Structure
– Force Employment
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MIT Lincoln Laboratory

2. Central Africa – Today

Chad
Nigeria
Sudan
Central African
Republic
Cameroon
Ethiopia
Somalia
Eq.
Guinea
Gabon
Congo
Rwanda
Uganda
Kenya
Burundi
Democratic
Republic of Congo
Angola
Tanzania
Malawi
Mozambique
Zambia
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MIT Lincoln Laboratory

3. Current Threat

The D.R.C. is a lawless
land unable to capitalize
on its huge store of
valuable natural resources
– Years of conflict have left
the D.R.C. in economic
turmoil and incapable of
assembling the resources
necessary to control its
borders or the multiple
factions inside the country
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MIT Lincoln Laboratory

4. Current Threat

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Strapped for the cash
needed to deal with their
enemies, D.R.C. has
shown a willingness to
deal with rouge nations
& terrorist organizations
D.R.C. has been the
object of terror states
and organizations to
obtain nuclear materials
for “dirty bombs” and
fissionable material to
generate WMD
MIT Lincoln Laboratory

5. Nuclear Fuel Cycle - 101

Mining
Uranium Dioxide Ore (UO2)
Milling
Uranium Oxide (U3O8) – Yellow cake
Conversion
Uranium Hexaflouride (UF6) - Gas
Recovered
Uranium
Plutonium
Permanent
Waste Storage
WMD
Enrichment
Enriched UF6 (EUF6) - Gas
Recycling
Fabrication
Power/Research
Reactors
Spent
Fuel
Storage
HEU or LEU
HEU
Plutonium
Weapons Grade Production
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High or Low
Enriched
Uranium Dioxide
(HEU or LEU) in
the form of fuel
pellets & rods
MIT Lincoln Laboratory

6. Vulnerability of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Mining
Nuclear material for “dirty bombs”
Fissionable material for a simple
10kt – 250kt plus nuclear weapon
Uranium Dioxide Ore (UO2)
Milling
Uranium Oxide (U3O8) – Yellow cake
Conversion
Uranium Hexaflouride (UF6) - Gas
Recovered
Uranium
Plutonium
Permanent
Waste Storage
WMD
Enrichment
Enriched UF6 (EUF6) - Gas
Recycling
Fabrication
Power/Research
Reactors
Spent
Fuel
Storage
HEU or LEU
HEU
Plutonium
Weapons Grade Production
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High or Low
Enriched
Uranium Dioxide
(HEU or LEU) in
the form of fuel
pellets & rods
MIT Lincoln Laboratory

8. Current Threat – Fissionable Material

University of Kinshasa Nuclear Research Reactor
CONGO
ANGOLA
• Built in 1959 via President
Eisenhower’s “Atoms for
Peace” program
Refurbished in 1972 and
uses HEU fuel rods
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MIT Lincoln Laboratory

9. Current Threat – Nuclear Material

D.R.C. Uranium Mines
Musonoi
Kamoto
• Uranium
Kasompi
Swambo
D.R.C.
Dioxide (UO2)
– 1 ton of ore
contains 0.6%
uranium
Kalongwe
Shinkolobwe
Luiswishi
• Mines closed or
converting to
Copper or Cobalt
– Shinkolowbe Mine
has rich vein of
UO2
100nm
Low-grade Uranium Ore
High-grade Uranium Ore
Supplied U.S. ore
for our first
generation of
nuclear weapons
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MIT Lincoln Laboratory

10. Current Threat – Nuclear Material

D.R.C. Uranium Mines
Musonoi
Kamoto
• Uranium
2)
• Dioxide
Uranium(UO
Oxide
(U
8) –ofYellow
– 31Oton
ore
Cake
contains 0.3 -
– 0.6%
Millinguranium
process
takes place
Shinkolowbe
close
the
Mine
hastorich
mine
vein of UO2
– Yellow cake
– U.S.
source
of–
contains
60%
ore
the first
85%for
uranium
generation of
U3O
8 milling was
nuclear
weapons
done at Kolwezi
– Mine closed due
andtoLikasi
low price of ore
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Kalongwe
Kasompi
Swambo
Shinkolobwe
D.R.C.
Luiswishi
100nm
Low-grade Uranium Ore
High-grade Uranium Ore
Yellow-Cake Milling Plants
MIT Lincoln Laboratory

11. Current Threat – Nuclear Materials Trafficking

• Two HEU fuel rods stolen in 1998
Rods recovered in Italy with 13 Italian mafia
arrested trying to sell material to Mid-east agents
• U.S. negotiations w/ D.R.C. for the return of
all HEU fuel rods have been unsuccessful
• Kenya detains 5 Iraqis
traveling on Indian
passports trying to get
to D.R.C. in 2001
• Tanzania seizes 5 containers of
yellow-cake in Kigoma in Feb ‘02
• Tanzania seizes 110kg of yellow
cake in Sumbawanga in Nov ‘02
North Korean mine
engineers & military
training cadre caught
in the Katanga mine
region in 1999
Exchanging military
training for access to
D.R.C.’s high-grade
uranium mines
• Diplomatic pressure on
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D.R.C. resulted in
North Korea’s
departure in 2000
Shinkolobwe
MIT Lincoln Laboratory

12. Current Intelligence

• A CIA electronic
surveillance in the
Gecamines building
(the D.R.C. state
mining company) in
Lubumbashi captured
the following:
– Le gâteau a été payé.
Préparer le chargement.
Le colbalt va dans trois
semaines.
Translation:
Lubumbashi
– The cake has been paid
for. Prepare the
shipment. The colbalt
goes in three weeks.
• DTG: 171740ZApr03
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MIT Lincoln Laboratory

13. Current Intelligence

Zanzibar
• The CIA in Zanzibar,
Tanzania tracking
elements of Al Qaeda
have intercepted
communications
indicating a “priority
shipment” is imminent
The intercept defined
the shipment as:
– “…key to the Jihad”
– “…will cripple the eagle”
– “…send the team in
two weeks”
• The call was traced
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to Zanzibar City
DTG: 171830ZApr03
MIT Lincoln Laboratory

14. Summary of the NSC Situation Brief

Cumulative CIA evidence suggests Al Qaeda
is working directly with Gecamines and the
D.R.C. government to acquire yellow-cake
from the Katanga mine region
– The shipment will depart the mine region in three
weeks
Exact location of the yellow-cake is unknown
– How the yellow-cake will be shipped is tentative
Possibly buried in a shipment of Cobalt already
scheduled for export
– The destination of the yellow-cake is unknown
An Al Qaeda cell in Zanzibar is involved
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MIT Lincoln Laboratory

15. Summary of the NSC Situation Brief (2)

CIA proposes a black operation to:
– Find the yellow-cake prior to shipment
– Track the shipment to its final destination
– Identify and maintain surveillance on the
members of the Al Qaeda network and the
D.R.C. government linked with the smuggling
operation
– At the designated time, pick-up the Al Qaeda
operatives and responsible D.R.C. government
officials, and
– Seize the yellow-cake
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CIA proposes SOCOM lead operation with
CIA operatives providing additional in-country
support
MIT Lincoln Laboratory

16. Summary of the NSC Situation Brief (3)

The President agreed with the CIA proposal
and made the following decisions:
– The operation will be covert
– Diplomatic coordination will be made only with the
host nation(s) needed to help position and provide
support to our assets on the ground
Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda were the only African
nations that publicly endorsed the U.S. war against Iraq
and may be willing to support a black operation
Tanzania and Kenya should be considered as allies as
they have stymied other yellow-cake shipments, and are
struggling with Muslim extremists in their countries
Zambia, pinched between Angola and Zimbabwe who have
lent military forces to defend D.R.C., can not be seen by
their neighbors as openly working against D.R.C.
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MIT Lincoln Laboratory

17. Summary of the NSC Situation Brief (4)

The President’s decisions continued:
– SOCOM will assume operational command of all
forces used for this operation…“Operation Cakewalk”
– CENTCOM, EUCOM, USCINCPAC, USSTRATCOM,
and USTRANSCOM will be supporting commands
– In addition, the President has directed simultaneous
contingency planning for an assault on the Kinshasa
Nuclear Research reactor
The objective is to determine the operational feasibility and
identify the resources required to seize and transport the
HEU fuel rods out of D.R.C. where the fissionable material
can be controlled
The planning effort is named “Operation Hot Rod” and maybe
executed in conjunction with seizing Al Qaeda and D.R.C.
operatives under Operation Cakewalk
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MIT Lincoln Laboratory

18. National Objectives

The President’s stated the following national
objectives for Operation Cakewalk:
– Ensure nation states and terror organizations
located in Central and East Africa are unable to
threaten the U.S. or our allies with weapons of
mass destruction
Stop the on-going, illicit trafficking of nuclear materials
materials within D.R.C.
Improve the safety of the U.S., our allies, and the world
by securing the fissionable materials in D.R.C.
Improve the stability of Central and East African nations
by removing terrorist organizations and subversive
government agents bent on obtaining and using
weapons of mass destruction
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MIT Lincoln Laboratory

19. CINC Objectives

Find, track, and stop D.R.C. shipment(s) of nuclear
materials (yellow-cake )
Identify the terrorist and nation state network illicitly
trafficking nuclear materials from D.R.C.
Capture or otherwise neutralize this trafficking
network
– Includes D.R.C. Government officials involved in
supplying and providing cover for the trafficking of
nuclear material
– Includes middle men and members of terrorists
organizations that support the trafficking of nuclear
materials and the development of WMD
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Place U.S. forces in a position that leads D.R.C. to
peacefully turn over the fissionable fuel rods from
the Kinshasa reactor or have them removed by
force
MIT Lincoln Laboratory

20. Operation Cakewalk – IPB

Define the Environment
– Terrain, weather, infrastructure, demographics
– History, political relationships, economics
Evaluate Tactics, Techniques, & Procedures
(TTP)
– Gecamines mining and product delivery
practices
– Kinshasa Nuclear Research Reactor
operations
– Al Qaeda cell operating techniques
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Assess Environment Impacts on TTP
Anticipated Opposition COAs
MIT Lincoln Laboratory

21. Southern Africa – Terrain & Weather

Southern Africa – Terrain & Weather
May-June-July
Percent of Annual Rainfall
500’<1500’
1500’<2500’
Dry
Season
(< 5% of
annual
rainfall)
Historical
Monthly Precipitation
Katanga Region
Katanga
mine region
3000’ < 4500’
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Likely
operating
area to track
shipment
MIT Lincoln Laboratory

22. Southern Africa - Vegetation

D.R.C.
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MITDrainage
Lincoln Laboratory
D.R.C.

23. Central Africa – Colonization/Languages

Colonial Name
Ougangui-Chari
CHAD
SUDAN
SOMALIA
MOZAMBIQUE
United Kingdom
Portugal
France
Italy
Belgium
Independent
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Current Name
Independence
Central African
1960/FRA
Republic
Sudan
Sudan
1956/UK
Somalia
Somalia
1960/ITA
Congo
Congo
1960/FRA
Belgian Congo
Democratic Republic 1965/BEL
of Congo
Uganda
Uganda
1962/UK
Rwanda
Rwanda
1962/BEL
Burundi
Burundi
1962/BEL
Kenya
Kenya
1963/UK
Tanganyika
Tanzania
1964/UK
Northern Rhodesia Zambia
1964/UK
Nyasaland*
Malawi
1966/UK
Languages
Angola
Angola
1975/POR
Today
Mozambique
Mozambique
1975/POR
*Nyasaland was a British Protectorate prior to being
merged with Northern Rhodesia in 1953 into what
was called the Central African Federation. The
federation was still a colony of the UK.
MIT Lincoln Laboratory

24. Southern Africa – Population Density

D.R.C.
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Southern
Rhodesia
MIT Lincoln
Laboratory
is now Zimbabwe

25. Religions of Central Africa

Muslim
Traditional
0
10
30
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50
100
0
10
30
Christian
50
100
0
10
30
50
100
Sudan’s border with C.A.R., D.C.R., and Uganda represents a
sharp divide between the density of Muslim and Christian people
MIT Lincoln Laboratory

26. Religions of Central Africa

Muslim
Traditional
0
10
30
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50
100
0
10
30
Christian
50
100
0
10
30
50
100
Sudan’s border with C.A.R., D.C.R., and Uganda represents a
sharp divide between the density of Muslim and Christian people
Tanzania is divided into religious sectors with traditional African
religions dominating the west, Christians in the center, and
Muslims along the coast
– D.R.C.’s eastern border with Tanzania, and to a lesser extent with, Uganda,
Rwanda, and Burundi, represents a significant divide between the density of
Christians and traditional African religions
MIT Lincoln Laboratory

27. Southern Africa – Infrastructure

Mombasa
D.R.C.
Dar es
Salaam
Kolwesi
Likasi
Lobito
D.R.C. Roads
• 95% Unpaved
Beira
Durban
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Cape Town
D.R.C.
Rail Laboratory
MIT Lincoln

28. Central Africa – Regional Conflict

Sudan vs SPLA
Sudan
C.A.R.
Bangui
Uganda
Congo
Kenya
The Sudanese Government is
engaged in a religious conflict with
the Sudan People’s Liberation Army
(SPLA)
• Islam vs SPLA Christians
• SPLA finds refuge across
Sudan’s borders
• Fighting on going since 1955
Rwanda
Burundi
D.R.C.
Brazzaville
Kinshasa
Tanzania
Angola
Zambia
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MIT Lincoln Laboratory

29. Central Africa – Regional Conflict

Sudan vs SPLA
C.A.R. vs Rebel Military
Sudan
C.A.R.
Bangui
Uganda
Congo
Rwanda
Burundi
D.R.C.
Brazzaville
Kinshasa
Tanzania
Kenya
The C.A.R. government has
endured continuous coup attempts
• 1996 – three failed coups
• 1997 – French Foreign Legion
pulls out of C.A.R.
• 1998 – U.N. police-keeping
force of 1400 maintain order in
Bangui, the capital
• 2001 – Two failed coups
• Oct 2002 – U.S. Gov’t personnel
ordered to leave the country
• No travel outside of capital
without armed escort
Angola
Zambia
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MIT Lincoln Laboratory

30. Central Africa – Regional Conflict

Sudan vs SPLA
C.A.R. vs Rebel Military
Congo vs Ninja Rebels
Sudan
C.A.R.
Bangui
Uganda
Congo
Rwanda
Burundi
D.R.C.
Brazzaville
Kinshasa
Tanzania
Kenya
The Congo has been in various
states of civil war since 1993
• The fighting is along ethnic/
tribal lines and has left over
800,000 homeless
• Ninja rebels have closed the
Ubangi River, which forms the
northern half of the Congo –
D.R.C. border
• U.S. Embassy operations in
Brazzaville, Congo were
suspended in 2002
Functions moved to D.R.C.
capital of Kinshasa just
across the Congo River
Angola
Zambia
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MIT Lincoln Laboratory

31. Central Africa – Regional Conflict

Sudan vs SPLA
C.A.R. vs Rebel Military
Congo vs Ninja Rebels
Sudan
C.A.R.
Bangui
D.R.C.– Safe Haven
Uganda
Congo
Rwanda
Burundi
D.R.C.
Brazzaville
Kinshasa
Tanzania
Angola
Zambia
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Kenya
Rwanda’s 4-year civil war between
the Tutsi and Hutus tribes ended in
1994
• 1-million dead; 2-million Hutus
refugees spilled into D.R.C.
• Hutus rebels (15,000 strong) have
been launching attacks against
Rwanda from D.R.C. ever since
Over 300,000 Ugandan refugees
have fled to D.R.C. and include:
• Hutus tribe members and
• Those running from the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA)
operating in Sudan and Northern
Uganda
100,000 displaced by
Ugandan authorities in Oct ’02
LRA accused of enslaving
children after raids
MIT Lincoln Laboratory

32. Central Africa – Regional Conflict

Sudan vs SPLA
C.A.R. vs Rebel Military
Congo vs Ninja Rebels
Sudan
C.A.R.
Bangui
Uganda
Congo
Rwanda
Burundi
D.R.C.
Brazzaville
Kinshasa
Tanzania
Angola
Kenya
DRC – Safe Haven
DRC vs
MLC CRD
D.R.C. has been fending off the
Movement for the Liberation of the
Congo (MLC) and the Congolese
Rally for Democracy (CRD) since
1997 when Laurent Kabila became
President by overthrowing the MLC
backed regime
• In 1998 Uganda and Rwanda
forces back the MLC & CRD
• Zimbabwe, Angola, & Nambia
send troops to prop up the D.R.C.
Government
• Jan ’01 Laurent Kabila is
assassinated and his son Joseph
named head of state
Zambia
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MIT Lincoln Laboratory

33. Central Africa – Regional Conflict

Sudan vs SPLA
C.A.R. vs Rebel Military
Congo vs Ninja Rebels
Sudan
C.A.R.
Bangui
UN
UN
UN
Congo
UN
D.R.C.
Brazzaville
Kinshasa
UN
UN
Rwanda
Burundi
UN
UN
UN
UN
Angola
Zambia
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Uganda
Tanzania
Kenya
DRC – Safe Haven
DRC vs
MLC CRD
UN
U.N. Peace Keepers
The United Nations has over 500
observers and 5,000 peacekeeping
troops in D.R.C. since ___. Nations
providing peacekeepers include:
•1
•2
•3
•4
While fighting can abruptly appear
anywhere in the country, even the
capital of Kinshasa, UN personnel
tend to monitor the no-man lands
between the factions
MIT Lincoln Laboratory

34. Central Africa – Regional Conflict

Sudan vs SPLA
C.A.R. vs Rebel Military
Congo vs Ninja Rebels
Sudan
C.A.R.
Bangui
UN
UN
UN
Congo
UN
D.R.C.
Brazzaville
Kinshasa
UN
UN
Kenya
Nairobi
Rwanda
Burundi
Mombasa
UN
UN
UN
UN
Angola
Zambia
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Uganda
Tanzania
Dar Es Salaam
DRC – Safe Haven
DRC vs
MLC CRD
UN
U.N. Peace Keepers
Terrorist Activity
U.S. Embassy bombings by
Al Qaeda operatives in Dar Es
Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi,
Kenya
• 250 dead, including twelve
Americans
• Over 5,000 injured
Al Qaeda terrorist activity in
Mombasa, Kenya
• Bombing killed 12 in Nov ‘02
• Attempted shoot down of Israeli
charter aircraft the same day
MIT Lincoln Laboratory

35. Central Africa – Economic Status

GDP ($B)
35
30
Debt ($B)
Population Data (M)
53.6M
D.R.C.
25
20
26M
Uganda
15
10
20M
9.8M 36.2M 10.4M
Angola
Tanzania
Zambia
5
7.3M Rwanda
6.2M Burundi
3.6M C.A.R.
2.9M Congo
Angola
Tanzania
Zambia
Burundi
Rwanda
D.R.C.
$1500
Uganda
-15
Congo
-10
C.A.R.
0
-5
$1000
0
Only $600.00 per capita income/year –
77% of population below poverty line
$31.1B in annual Gross Domestic
Product
25%
50%
75%
XYZ 6/3/2018
Central Africa one of the poorest
regions of the world
D.R.C. is poorest of the poor:
– D.R.C. has the largest disparity in the
distribution of its wealth
$500
100%999999-35
• Continuous conflict has made
– D.R.C. has the highest national debt MIT Lincoln Laboratory
$12.4B
Capita Income
Percent Below Poverty Line

36. Opposition TTP

To be supplied
– DRC Mining practices
– Kinshasa reactor operations
– Al Qaeda cell practices
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MIT Lincoln Laboratory

37. Shipment COA Analysis

Shipment Options
• Rail COA
• Road COA
• Rail/Road COA
• Air COA
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MIT Lincoln Laboratory

38. Opposition COA Analysis – Rail

Mombasa
Ilebo
Kolwesi To:
Dist (Km) # Days
Lobito
1450/@
1
Kalemie
Dar es
Salaam
Kamina
Kolwesi
Likasi
Lobito
Beira
@ - Not operational
Durban
Cape Town
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MIT Lincoln Laboratory

39. Opposition COA Analysis – Rail

Mombasa
Ilebo
Kalemie
Dar es
Salaam
Kamina
Kolwesi
Kolwesi To:
Lobito
Dar es
Salaam
Dist (Km)/ Border
X-ings
# Days
1450/@
2125/4
1
2
Likasi
Lobito
Beira
@ - Not operational
Durban
Cape Town
999999-39
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MIT Lincoln Laboratory

40. Opposition COA Analysis – Rail

Mombasa
Ilebo
Kalemie
Dar es
Salaam
Kamina
Kolwesi
Likasi
Kolwesi To:
Lobito
Dar es
Salaam
Mombasa
Dist (Km)/ Border
X-ings
# Days
1450/@
2125/4
1
2
2315/6*
3
Lobito
Beira
@ - Not operational
* - Requires transload from
1.000m gauge track to
1.067m gauge track
Durban
Cape Town
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MIT Lincoln Laboratory

41. Opposition COA Analysis – Rail

Mombasa
Ilebo
Kalemie
Dar es
Salaam
Kamina
Kolwesi
Likasi
Lobito
Beira
Kolwesi To:
Lobito
Dar es
Salaam
Mombasa
Beira
Dist (Km)/ Border
X-ings
# Days
1450/@
2125/4
1
2
2315/6*
2459/5
3
3
@ - Not operational
* - Requires transload from
1.000m gauge track to
1.067m gauge track
Durban
Cape Town
999999-41
XYZ 6/3/2018
MIT Lincoln Laboratory

42. Opposition COA Analysis – Rail

Mombasa
Ilebo
Kalemie
Dar es
Salaam
Kamina
Kolwesi
Likasi
Lobito
Beira
Kolwesi To:
Lobito
Dar es
Salaam
Mombasa
Beira
Durban
Dist (Km)/ Border
X-ings
# Days
1450/@
2125/4
1
2
2315/6*
2459/5
2936/6
3
3
4
@ - Not operational
* - Requires transload to
1.067 gauge track
Durban
Cape Town
999999-42
XYZ 6/3/2018
MIT Lincoln Laboratory

43. Transportation Options: Rail

Mombasa
Ilebo
Kalemie
Dar es
Salaam
Kamina
Kolwesi
Likasi
Lobito
Beira
Kolwesi To:
Lobito
Dar es
Salaam
Mombasa
Beira
Durban
Cape Town
Dist (Km)/ Border
X-ings
# Days
1450/@
2125/4
1
2
2315/6*
2459/5
2936/6
3611/7
3
3
4
4
@ - Not operational
* - Requires transload to
1.067 gauge track
Durban
Cape Town
999999-43
XYZ 6/3/2018
MIT Lincoln Laboratory

44. Transportation Options: Rail

Mombasa
Ilebo
Kigoma
Kalemie
Dar es
Salaam
Kamina
Kolwesi
Likasi
Lobito
Segment
Mode
Beira
Dist. # Days
Kolwesi –
Rail
Kalemie
(1.000m)
Kalemie –
Ferry
Kigoma
Kigoma –
Rail
Dar es Salaam (1.067m)
1170
3
75
3
676
2
Total
1821
Durban 8
Kolwesi To:
Lobito
Dar es
Salaam
Mombasa
Beira
Durban
Cape Town
Dist (Km)/ Border
X-ings
# Days
1450/@
2125/4
1
2
2315/6*
2459/5
2936/6
3611/7
3
3
4
4
@ - Not operational
* - Requires transload to
1.067 gauge track
Cape Town
999999-44
XYZ 6/3/2018
MIT Lincoln Laboratory

45. Most Likely Railroad COA

•A
Kolwesi
Likasi
Lubumbashi
D.R.C.
Chingola
D.R.C.
Zambia
Ndola
Kapiri Mposhi
Mpika
D.R.C.
Kolwesi
Zambia
Tunduma
Njombe
Kasama
Kasama
Tunduma
Likasi
Lubumbashi
Zambia
Tanzania
Mbeya
Mpika
Chingola
Njombe
Dar es Salaam
999999-45
XYZ 6/3/2018
MIT Lincoln Laboratory

46. Shipment COA Analysis – Road

999999-46
XYZ 6/3/2018
To be supplied
MIT Lincoln Laboratory

47. Shipment COA Analysis – Air

999999-47
XYZ 6/3/2018
To be supplied
MIT Lincoln Laboratory

48. Opposition COA Analysis – Air

To be supplied….
Blue Force Course of Action Analysis
– Force Structure
– Force Employment
999999-48
XYZ 6/3/2018
MIT Lincoln Laboratory

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